

was one of those who put this view:—

“They weren’t looking to start any riot, they didn’t want trouble. It just happened. It was just in self-defence, they had to defend themselves and they tried to defend the Farm.”

Michael Hutchinson-Reis put it in similar terms:—

“They had nothing to gain from what they did. The motivation was something else. And that motivation quite clearly in my mind was that they saw themselves defending their community, they saw themselves under threat, they saw themselves threatened physically, and they defended themselves. And that understanding of the motivation of those arrested, when you actually follow through the implications, that’s got serious consequences not just for social workers but for this society as a whole.

This issue of “reasonable self defence” may be raised at the forthcoming trials. We must therefore avoid making judgements about the legality of particular kinds of action, which may be the subject of argument before a jury. The purpose of this chapter has been to describe, as fully as possible upon the evidence which we have gathered, what happened on 6th October at Broadwater Farm.

We return in Chapter 8 to discuss why it happened and how to stop it happening again.

Chapter 6 THE AFTERMATH

THE FIRST WEEK

6.1 On 7th October the police remained on and around the estate in force. In the evening the Police Research Unit staff noted around 200 officers on the estate, the majority dressed in riot overalls and carrying shields; two coaches full of police parked in Adams Road; another coach at the junction of Mount Pleasant Road and The Avenue; and ten transit vans parked in The Avenue. In the whole Tottenham and Wood Green area, they calculated that nearly 1,500 officers were deployed. The focus of attention on the estate was the Youth Association. Outside there were police officers spread all over the precinct and balconies of Tangmere. Inside people gathered, talking about the night before, unsure what was going to happen now. Councillor Andrew Mitchell tried to act as a mediator between the youth and the police. He met D.A.C. Richards, who said that he would only agree to reduce the level of policing if the council would agree to let the police have a flat or an office on the estate. He also said that it would help if the Youth Association could be shut for the night. The council refused to offer accommodation, and the officers of the Youth Association reacted with considerable hostility to both of the requests which the police had made. Councillor Mitchell remained on the estate until 1.00 am pleading with the police to step back from their positions close up to the Youth Association doors, which eventually they did. We think that Councillor Mitchell showed considerable moral courage in his actions on that day. Although he failed to achieve any concrete agreement (which in the circumstances was not surprising), by staying around and being in touch with both sides he helped to ensure that there was no further flare-up in the course of that day and night.

6.2 The estate was also swarming with journalists and broadcasters. The events of the night had been reported in the morning papers,

which featured pictures of the rioting and headlines about the death of the policeman. On Monday the journalists' job was to discover the background to what had happened. Their efforts, as printed in the papers of 8th October, make sorry reading. A frequent theme was that the whole event was organised by left wing agitators:—

"STREET FIGHTING EXPERTS TRAINED IN MOSCOW AND LIBYA WERE BEHIND BRITAIN'S WORST VIOLENCE."

(*Daily Express*)

"THE TOTTENHAM RIOT WAS IGNITED BY WELL PREPARED OUTSIDERS." (*Daily Mirror*)

The responsibility for this theme must be taken by the Commissioner Sir Kenneth Newman, who at a press conference on 7th October said:—

"Groups of trotskysts and anarchists had been identified as orchestrating the disturbances in Tottenham and in Brixton a week earlier. They are both Black and White and come from within and outside London, operating in areas of ethnic concentration."

It was highly irresponsible for the Commissioner to make this statement at a time when the investigations into the Tottenham disturbances had scarcely begun. As it turned out, within ten days, the police had completely discounted this theory. The *London Standard* reported on 17th October:—

"No evidence of agitation before the riot by politically inspired groups had been found by police. A Scotland Yard spokesman said: 'We don't believe outside agitators were responsible for what happened in Tottenham'."

But many more people must have read the original headlines than read the later retraction. Prejudices were fed, and distress and anxiety caused, by a statement which should never have been made.

6.3 A second theme was the picture of Broadwater Farm as a hellish place of criminal activity and racial hatred:—

"A daily war being waged against White families by the younger members of a burgeoning Black community who occupy virtually all the flats in the 12 blocks of grey, stained concrete that make up the divided zone." (*Daily Mail*, 8th October)

"The local name for the 12 blocks of flats there is Alcatraz, and if you are poor and White, old and ill, it's a vicious and frightening prison. White people there do feel they are living in an alien and terrifying land and nobody will even listen to them, let alone help them." (*Daily Mail*, 9th October)

"They sit there, these gaunt tower blocks, like citadels of disillusion. They are scruffy. They are battered. They smell." (*Daily Mirror*, under the headline "Living hell".)

An Asian man whom we interviewed described the attitude of reporters who spoke to him on the Monday:—

"When the newspapers interviewed me the next day, they wanted me to say it was Black against White. When I said it wasn't, they didn't really want to know anything. It didn't make headlines."

Cliff Ford, an estate sweeper and active Tenants' Association member, tried to exercise a right of reply:—

"I wrote to the *Daily Mail* myself and said, 'what about the Christmas dinners, the social things that the Youth Association does?' They didn't want to know about that, they never published that at all."

An article in the *Times* headed **"THE ESTATE THAT DOLLY KIFFIN RESCUED FROM NIGHTMARE"** stands out as being a serious effort to describe the achievements of the Broadwater Farm community. Neale Coleman, Neighbourhood Officer, spoke of the "considerable anger" among residents about the reports in most of the newspapers, and added that the television and radio tended to be more responsible.

6.4 The racist theme which appears in some of the reports which we have quoted — White people being hated and terrorised by Black — was reinforced by headlines about "hyenas", "butchers", and "monsters". It became personalised in a particularly unpleasant way around Councillor Bernie Grant. A report in the *Sun* of 9th October, under the headline **"DON'T CALL ME BARMY BERNIE"**, describes Councillor Grant as "peeling a banana and juggling with an orange". An unnamed Labour councillor is quoted in the report as saying that:—

"Bernie Grant is like the leader of a Black tribe — always looking for battles and shaking his spear. He sees all Whites as his enemy."

This kind of reporting had nothing to do with criticism of Councillor Grant's statements, which we analyse below. The crude images of Councillor Grant as being a madman from the jungle were inexcusable, and they were to continue for months.

6.5 One theme which did not feature prominently in the newspapers was any serious analysis of how Mrs Jarrett's home came to be searched or what happened there, nor any of the wider issues about

policing in Tottenham. On 7th October a number of newspapers had printed the two conflicting versions of the circumstances of her death. By 8th October virtually all the press coverage centred on the hatred and the violence of rioters towards the police. There was little attempt made to understand why it was (apart from the "agitators" theory) that so much hatred was felt. Exceptions were the *Guardian* and the *Morning Star*, who on 8th October both printed detailed reports about the raid on the Jarrett home.

6.6 On 7th October Councillor Bernie Grant spoke at a press conference. He gave the press a number of details about the raid on Mrs Jarrett's home. He was asked if he condemned the violence of the riots and replied:—

"I find it difficult to condemn anybody for what happened after the death of an innocent woman."

In answer to questions about the murder of PC Blakelock, he said:—

"I don't know anything about it...maybe it was a policeman who stabbed another policeman. I don't know the circumstances of it and I do not wish to get involved in it."

On the following day, 8th October, there was an open air meeting going on outside Tottenham Town Hall. Councillor Grant was visiting the Town Hall on other business, and was asked to come over and say a few words. He took the megaphone and, according to a press report, which he accepted as being accurate, he said:—

"The reason Sir Kenneth Newman is threatening the use of rubber bullets is because on Sunday night the police got a bloody good hiding. The police will not accept that Black youths can successfully organise themselves and outsmart them and outmanoeuvre them."

He again repeated that he was not going to condemn the actions of the youth on Sunday night.

6.7 We questioned Councillor Grant closely about these statements. He made a distinction between them. He regretted that he had made the remark that the policeman may have been killed by another policeman. He had been trying to make the point that the death was still being investigated and one should not jump to conclusions. He told us that it was "a bit of ridiculous thing to say, in retrospect". He commented that he must have spoken half a million words during that period, and the press had pulled out and concentrated on two or three statements.

6.8 Councillor Grant did not withdraw his remarks about the police getting a good hiding and being outmanoeuvred. He explained that he had been putting forward the view not only of the young people, but of a substantial section of the community. We asked him whether he agreed with that view. He replied that factually the youths did outmanoeuvre the police. There then followed a question and answer session which we think right to set out in full. Lord Gifford referred to Councillor Grant's speech of the 14th October calling for reconciliation, and continued:—

Lord Gifford: "Is it really consistent with a desire for reconciliation to make statements which, whether factually true or not, give the strong impression of taking sides with the youth against the police and supporting them in a battle of two sides?"

Councillor Grant: "Well yes, I would think so, because I think we have to understand that the young people are at the bottom of the social pile; that all the forces were ranged against them at the particular period. I think that it's part of the job of a political leader to assess the situation and face various sections of the community. If I had condemned the young people, as well as the whole of the press, media, Government and so on, I think that today we would have the situation that has occurred in other places in the country, in Liverpool and in Handsworth. When Neil Kinnock came to Broadwater Farm, he made one important observation. He said he had been to other places after disturbances, and on Broadwater Farm he found that the spirit of the young people was very strong, that people weren't demoralised. In all the other cases, in Handsworth and everywhere else, all the people were demoralised. And I think that the reason that they were not demoralised was that I did not come out and condemn them like everybody wanted. So they felt Haringey and the rest of the council and the Labour Party stood behind them in this particular situation. They felt that they were not condemned totally by society. This tenuous thread that we set up between us and the youths is now beginning to develop, and now we are able to wean the youths away from acts of violence into political action. For example, in the election they voted for the first time."

6.9 We consider that this was a cogent answer which deserves careful attention. Councillor Grant was clearly aware on 7th October of the need to maintain a relationship between the Black community, particularly the youths, and the established political structures which

he represented. He himself, it is clear, did not believe in the use of violence against the police, and was shocked by both of the deaths which had occurred. But he understood the background of injustice, and had himself experienced, at the meeting at the Youth Association on 6th October, the bitter rejection of many of those present of conventional political methods.

6.10 Instead of avoiding the problem by distancing himself from Black youths, he tried honestly to articulate their position. In doing so he walked a tightrope, for as an elected leader he represented others also. The words quoted above were not well chosen and should not have been said. He knew as a political leader that the press would seize on an ill-considered phrase; and in this case they did, leading to the impression that Councillor Grant revelled in the defeat of the police. However, we are impressed with the honesty and courage which Councillor Grant showed in trying to articulate the grievances which had led to the disturbances, and in particular the death of Mrs Jarrett, rather than evading the issue with bland statements.

6.11 Councillor Grant gave his considered views to a special meeting of the council on 14th October 1985. He expressed his wholehearted personal sympathy to the families of Mrs Jarrett and PC Blakelock. He explained why he had spoken as he had, and accepted that "some things could have been better said". He appealed to the police to show respect for the young people of Haringey, and asked for a rethink of how Tottenham is policed. He said that the Labour group had stepped back from withholding the police precept. He then continued:—

"Next I want to speak to the young people of Tottenham. I said earlier that I had spoken the truth last week about their situation and their attitudes. Now I want to speak my mind to them. I want to say that some things are wrong. Drug trafficking is wrong. Thieving is wrong. Attacks on old people are wrong. Many of them have spent a lifetime fighting oppression also.

"And I want to say to the young people: violence offers no solution to your problems. You can't fight hatred with hatred. You can't fight fear with fear. You can't fight violence with violence. The state's response will always escalate. Next time rubber bullets and CS gas will be used. The time after that, the army will be brought in.

"The only way forward is through political action. I believe that the

line I have taken over the last week has opened up at least the possibility of drawing young people into a dialogue about peaceful political solutions to your problems. If we could achieve that, it would be a great step forward. So I appeal to you: step back from the violence and allow the council to speak for you."

The whole of this speech was applauded by a large public from the Broadwater Farm community. The evidence which we have received indicates that they wished to heed Councillor Grant's words. The high voting turnout — 55% at the local election — also indicates a willingness to use political channels. It may well be right that Councillor Grant's actions helped to contribute to social unity and constructive change.

6.12 On Broadwater Farm in the week following the disturbances, there was a real emergency. Postmen made no deliveries on the estate on 7th October, 10th October, 11th October and 12th October. The reason recorded in the Post Office report was "police advice". Joanne George was told by the Chief Postmaster that postmen did try to deliver letters, but the police told them not to, because it would hamper their inquiries. Giro cheques, on which so many people depended for their income, had been sent back to the Department of Health and Social Security, leaving many people with no money at all. Emergency supplies of food were distributed twice during that week — first on Monday, to pensioners and other vulnerable people who could not get to the shops outside the estate, and again on Friday because the Giro cheques had not arrived. The agencies which had been set up on the estate over the years proved their value — council staff from the Neighbourhood Office worked with Youth Association workers to cope with the needs and problems of many residents. This collaboration provided essential supplies to people whose situation would otherwise have been desperate.

6.13 The physical damage and mess was cleared up with remarkable speed. There were pavements to be repaired, burnt cars to be removed, rubble and glass to be cleared away and the shops to be boarded up. But by the end of the second day, only the burnt scorch marks on the roadway and smoke on the pillars of the blocks remained. The Broadwater Farm Junior and Infant schools were opened on 8th October, and the more damaged special schools by the following Monday. The Head of the Junior School appreciating that children would have experienced the events and perhaps been

disturbed by them, encouraged them to speak and write about them.

He told us:—

“In their writing they expressed fear and fright from the noise, the explosions and the police, but some of them quite enjoyed the event.”

The owners of cars which had been destroyed were left without compensation for their loss. Their claims under the Riot Damages Act were refused; the Act provides compensation for damage to premises through riots, but was passed in 1886 before the age of the motor vehicle.

THE ARRESTS AND SEARCHES

6.14 On Thursday 10th October came the first arrests by the squad of officers assigned to the murder investigations. By the end of November, there had been 141 arrests; by the end of May there had been 359. 18% of those arrested were juveniles, 9% were women. The great majority lived on or were closely connected with Broadwater Farm. 271 homes on the estate — over a quarter of the whole estate — were searched by the police. In 18 cases the doors were smashed in with sledgehammers and had to be replaced. By the end of May, 162 people had been charged with offences alleged to have been committed on 6th October, including six charged with murder and riot, seven with riot, 56 with affray and three with explosives (petrol bomb) charges. According to government statistics 71% of those arrested were Black, and 25% were White.

6.15 It is important to set the legal context in which these arrests were made. The police team had reason to believe that hundreds of people had done acts which (subject to any legal defences) were crimes under the law. They had taken a huge number of photographs on the night. From 13th October they had been conducting house-to-house inquiries around the whole estate, recording a range of information from place of birth to knowledge of neighbours and of the night's events. It would not have been surprising if they had identified a number of people who could reasonably be suspected of having committed offences. If so, the law allowed them to arrest such people and search their homes. The law also allowed the police to question suspects, subject to certain safeguards. If from legitimate questioning they obtained information which led to reasonable suspicion of others, they were entitled to arrest them also.

6.16 The investigation has undoubtedly caused and continues to cause great fear, suffering and outrage, particularly for those arrested and charged and their families. Is this the inevitable result of a legitimate criminal investigation? Or have the police in carrying out the investigation abused their legal powers? A representative of the Broadwater Farm Defence Campaign understood this key distinction when he said:—

“In a way it is accepted that they are going to be arrested for what has happened, but I feel that in many cases they are not so much worried about being arrested, but about the way they are arrested.”

6.17 In dealing with this issue the Inquiry faces certain limitations. Nearly all the people who have been charged are still awaiting trial; they and their solicitors have not been able to give evidence to us about their cases. The justification of the investigating team for some of their actions — breaking doors, detention over days, refusing access to solicitors — is not known, and may become clearer during the coming trial. Even those who have been released without charge continue to be fearful, and few have given evidence to us. Many people's experiences have been relayed at second hand by other witnesses. Accordingly, in reviewing the evidence about the police investigation we have described the position at law (this itself is complex because the law changed on 1st January 1986); set out the allegations made in general terms; and raised certain questions. In most cases we have not made definite findings. But the questions, and the answers which must eventually be given at the end of the trial, are of central importance to the integrity of the police investigations.

6.18 On 1st January 1986 the main provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 relating to police powers of arrest, search, detention and questioning, came into force. As well as the Act, there were Codes of Practice — in particular — codes relating to the searching of premises and the seizure of property, and to the detention treatment and questioning of persons by police officers. We will refer to the Act and the Codes of Practice as “the new law”. Before the new law came into force, there were a number of legal controls over police investigations, such as the Judges Rules; but in general these controls (“the old law”) were less clearly defined.

6.19 A further complication was that in the period from July to December 1985, the police at Tottenham Police Station were

conducting a "trial run" of the new Act. We understand this to mean, in theory at least, that police officers had been told to use the procedures and safeguards of the new law as far as they were legally able to. Many have alleged to us that in practice, the extended police powers of the new law were operated, but its safeguards were not.

6.20 The smashing down of the front door is the most horrific intrusion imaginable into the privacy of the home. It was done to 18 homes on Broadwater Farm, a shattering experience for the occupants, and a cause of great fear to many others. Joanne George said:—

"You would go to bed and you would just lie there and you would think are they going to come and kick my door, what's going to happen to my children? Wherever you went that's all you heard — am I next? If your friend's house got raided and arrested, are they coming for me? It was that horrible fear that you lived with day by day, knowing that they could come and kick down your door and come and drag you off and hold you for hours."

6.21 The smashing of doors was carried out by a large squad including armed officers. Rupert Downing described a scene early one Sunday morning, after he had slept overnight in a flat on the estate:—

"There was this huge noise and the whole block was rocking. I went out of the front door of the flat to find out what was going on, to be confronted by an officer with a very large high-powered rifle standing immediately outside the flat. He looked very surprised to see this White geezer with a brief-case coming out of the flat. I went downstairs to the precinct to find about 50 police officers hammering in the door of the Fruit and Veg Co-op."

Rupert Downing knew that the police had already searched the Co-op several times with the full co-operation of the workers. He asked the officers why they did not contact the Co-op, but got no answer. He overheard a plain clothes officer say to another, "We are going to have to be a bit more careful."

6.22 D.A.C. Richards, interviewed on the *Diverse Reports* programme in October 1986, said:—

"Policemen would not force their way into flats if there were any other means of getting into the flat. We have to gain entry into the premises and because they are well fortified the only way we can get into the premises is by way of sledgehammers or fairly hefty

equipment. If we had the keys to get into the premises it would be very much easier."

Later in the same programme, D.A.C. Richards sought to justify the methods used by reference to the scale of the crimes committed:—

"I wonder if we can get the Broadwater Farm in its true perspective — we are investigating a most horrific murder — a policeman stabbed to death. We witnessed at the Broadwater Farm the most ferocious, the most vicious riots ever seen on the mainland. It is therefore in the very nature of things if we are seeking murderers and gunmen, that on occasion, we will have to take what some people will see as dramatic action, reactive measures."

6.23 The statement that the premises were "well fortified" was misleading. It suggested people making a barricade of their doors. In fact, as D.A.C. Richards must have known, the doors were "fortified" by the council, on the advice of crime prevention officers, as a protection against burglars. If there is any proper justification for the smashing down of so many doors, it could only be in the context of the use of firearms during the disturbances. A reasonable belief that the smashing down of a door was necessary to protect police officers from being shot, would in theory justify such force. But in reality, how would the heavy and continuous smashing of a door protect the lives of police officers? Would it not rather alert the alleged "gunman" to their presence outside his door? Did the investigating team who smashed these 18 doors consider seriously what outrage they were inflicting? Did they balance that against the supposed risks to their officers? Or were they acting in this way simply to intimidate not just the occupants of the particular flats, but the estate as a whole?

6.24 Vivid evidence was given to us about the arrival of the arresting team on 17th October at the home of Mrs Scott, who lives in a house in Tottenham, (not on the estate):—

"While I was ironing I heard the gate open and two persons talk so I thought somebody was coming to the door and I look, I didn't see anybody. Then I saw something rush across the window and I saw one pointing up. I went over and look and I saw one pointing to my bedroom, on at the gate with his hand on the trigger like this, pointing straight to the front door, one next door pointing like this. I heard my daughter scream, the youngest one. She was partly dressed in the bathroom and there were three pointing the guns at her in the bathroom. And others surround the place."

Mrs Scott said that there were seven officers who entered the house with guns, and others over in the gardens behind her house. One of the officers produced a piece of paper which he said was a warrant to search the house for firearms. Mrs Scott described what was taken from the house:—

“My husband was going to Jamaica and we went out shopping in Finefare. All my food has the stamp on it for Finefare and we brought a lot of tinned meats and flour, sugar, rice and all — everything possible to send home, and they took everything just the same. And photographs. There were six in Roger’s room. They took all his complete clothes, his complete wardrobe. I remember one count 17 pairs of jeans. They took suits, they took everything. They broke my trunk, they took out things I bought before Millard was born and you don’t see those things now.”

Mrs Scott said that some of the clothes had been returned but none of the food. She got no receipt for the goods which had been taken. She herself has been visiting hospital for her nerves ever since. It should be noted that none of her family were charged with any offence arising from 6th October; Stafford Scott was arrested on the same day, held for 36 hours, and released without any charge.

6.25 Bagfuls of personal possessions were removed from many homes:— including complete wardrobes of clothes, contents of food cupboards, or kitchen knives, television and stereo equipment, personal diaries and photographs. People needed emergency assistance from Social Security because they were literally without anything to wear. A lot of property has now been returned, but some remains in police hands, even though the owner has not been charged. Requests from solicitors have often been met with the excuse that the police are too busy. The law allows a police officer to seize and retain property if it is needed for evidence at a trial, or for forensic examination, or if it may be stolen. We can understand that the investigating officers would justify the retention of knives and clothes for traces of blood or matching with photographs. Taking food seems more difficult to justify, since the supermarket was looted mainly for ammunition, and labels could be checked on the spot without taking everything away. The questions which we have to ask are :— Was there a real belief that the property taken might provide evidence of an offence, or was property taken on mere speculation? Were personal papers and diaries taken because of their relevance to any crime, or to enable the police to build up and record on computer a

general network of intelligence about the residents of the estate, their habits of life and their friends? Were the searches and seizures normal for a serious inquiry, or were they also part of a process of intimidation?

DETENTION AND QUESTIONING

6.26 Those who were arrested were taken to one of a variety of police stations (14 in all were used) and held incommunicado. The one police station which was not used was Tottenham. Their relatives had no idea where they were. Sheila Ramdin, chair of the new Residents’ Association, describes their distress:—

“I have had mothers coming to me screaming, crying. They don’t know where their son is, someone has been picked up, they don’t know what police station. We tried to phone around to find out where their son is. They might say, well he’s in Chingford, and then we phone Chingford. Who told you he’s at Chingford? It’s not Chingford. It must be somewhere else. We don’t know where he is. We haven’t got him here.”

In one case it took the workers at the day nursery a whole day to find out where a mother was, whose child was at the nursery. Debbie Wilde reported on the detention of a pregnant woman whose relatives were kept waiting all day to see her, despite promises that access would be given. There is no doubt that great suffering was caused through the mental anguish of not knowing where a relative was or what was happening to him or her.

6.27 The new law provides that a person arrested and held in a police station has the right to have one friend or relative told of the arrest and where the person is detained. Delay in allowing this right is only permitted when an officer of Superintendent rank has reasonable grounds for believing that this will lead to interference with evidence, or the alerting of other people, or will hinder the recovery of property. The old law gave a similar right, except that delay was permitted if it was necessary in the interests of the investigation or prevention of crime. What justification existed for the denial of the right in these cases? What evidence would have been interfered with, if relatives had been informed? What other people would have been alerted? How would the recovery of property have been hindered? We find it difficult to believe that these questions can be answered. However serious the investigation, it is not acceptable for police officers to hide suspects away in unknown places.

6.28 There was a uniform policy to forbid arrested people access to a solicitor. The new law provides that an arrested person has in theory the right to consult a solicitor privately at any time. But delay in granting this right may only be authorised by a Superintendent if there are reasonable grounds for believing that exercising it will lead to interference with evidence, or injury to other persons, or the alerting of other suspects, or will hinder the recovery of property. In any case, under the new law, the right must be granted after 36 hours. Yet in the months of 1985 when the new law was meant to be having a trial run, the 36 hour rule was not respected. The right of access to a solicitor under the old law was defined more loosely: a person had the right unless unreasonable delay or hindrance would be caused to the processes of investigation or the administration of justice. The Court of Appeal had clearly ruled that it was not permissible to deny the right because an investigating officer feared that a solicitor would inform the suspect of his or her rights. Yet in this investigation, the policy of refusing access to a solicitor was maintained on many occasions even after people had appeared in court, when they were remanded in police custody for further questioning. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the investigating officers denied access to solicitors because they wished to hold suspects incommunicado for long periods and thus put maximum pressure upon them to make a confession.

6.29 On a few occasions the investigating officers went as far as saying that a suspect could not have access to his or her chosen solicitor, but only to a solicitor chosen by the police. The investigating officers claimed that there was "a conflict of interest" between that suspect and other clients of the same solicitor. An attempt was made to get a High Court order to prevent this, but the judge said that he had no jurisdiction to intervene. One of the solicitors involved, Gabriel Black, described this action by the police as "utterly outrageous", and we agree. It is no business whatsoever of the police to decide whether a solicitor has a conflict of interests. Another solicitor, Gwen Bart, said that the conduct of the police during this investigation was quite unlike anything that she had experienced before. We asked her in what way did she think that the police were abusing their legal powers:-

"Basically it's the attitude that they have had when they have arrested people. When you ring the station they take a long time to return calls, and sometimes they have not returned calls. They have declined to give a lot of information. They have interviewed some

of the suspects very late at night. I just feel as though they take it personally, ie 'one of us is dead and you are going to pay for it'."

Gabriel Black was concerned that when her clients' rights had been abused, there was no form of accountability or channel for complaint. In the past she had contacted Scotland Yard's Complaints Division, but in this investigation "it seemed that the whole way up the line was just a blank".

6.30 The time spent by suspects in detention and questioning at the police stations was considerable. It was common for people to be detained for two and three days without being charged. In the case of many who were charged, the charge would be for a minor offence, but the police would apply at the Magistrates Court for a remand into police custody for three days, so that they could continue questioning the defendant about "more serious offences". Andy Shallice, who was observing in Tottenham Magistrates Court on a research project for the Runnymede Trust, noted 30 such applications, of which 28 were granted, out of 100 Broadwater Farm cases which he witnessed.

6.31 Under the old law the police were obliged to bring an arrested person before a magistrates court "as soon as practicable". What was practicable would vary according to the time of arrest and the time of court sittings. The view of lawyers was that the law allowed for detention in a police station for 48 hours at the outside. Under the new law, the maximum period of detention without charge is 96 hours, but the police are obliged to obtain authorisation from a magistrates court in a private hearing for any detention after 36 hours. The power of the Magistrates Court to order a remand into police custody for three days existed both under the old law and the new, although in practice it had normally been employed when a defendant was willing to be detained in the police station; for example a defendant who was giving information to the police about other people. As noted above, the new law gives an absolute right of access to a solicitor after 36 hours, including during any period on remand in police custody, whereas the right to see a solicitor under the old law was much more vague.

6.32 Accordingly the police, by detaining people in the police station for up to three days in the first instance, were stretching their powers under the old law to the legal limit and beyond. By applying for remands into police custody, the police were obtaining legal authority

for a further three days of questioning. By refusing access to solicitors during the whole of the questioning period, the police were taking advantage of the looseness of the old law, and (although they were meant to be carrying out a test run of the new Act) they were refusing to observe the provision of the new law which allows access as a right to a solicitor after 36 hours. Why were people being detained and questioned for such long periods? Was it in order to obtain true and voluntary information about serious criminal offences? Or was it to isolate and put pressure on vulnerable young people in order to obtain "confessions" from them? These are questions which are certain to be raised during the trial of particular defendants. We are only able to observe in general terms that the longer a person is detained incommunicado and interrogated, the greater the danger that a false confession will be made. That is the purpose of the safeguards in the new law, and we are disturbed that they were not respected during the course of this investigation.

6.33 The evidence relating to the treatment of juveniles was also most disturbing. 23 juveniles (ie young people under 17) were brought before the courts on charges arising from the disturbances, and the majority of these are still awaiting trial. Other juveniles were arrested and released without charge. Michael Hutchinson-Reis, one of the Broadwater Farm social work team and an experienced social worker, described the situation as he saw it:—

"A large part of our work after 6th October was actually tracking down where juveniles were being kept. It is a significant change in procedures that juveniles were being held for such long periods, quite often released without charge, and in many instances held incommunicado, when families, relatives, solicitors and social workers spent a lot of time actually trying to locate them."

The policy of refusing access to solicitors was applied also to juveniles. Michael Hutchinson-Reis described the problems which he faced in trying to help a juvenile who had admitted to having stolen three Mars bars on the night of 6th October:—

"That juvenile was questioned not so much about what he had stolen, which he admitted, but about his circumstances, his whereabouts, who he was with, what happened, for about three hours. Eventually at 9 o'clock on a Friday evening he was kept in the station. I made representations to the police about contact with relatives, solicitors and so on, and basically I was eased out of the police station in a way I have not usually had the experience of."

6.34 The written submission to us from the council's Social Services Department discloses other instances which give rise to intense concern as to whether the rights of juveniles were respected. It records that in some cases adults who were total strangers were brought in to witness interviews in police stations (since by law a "responsible adult" must be present when a juvenile is interviewed). It records that one boy was observed to appear in court wearing paper clothes, another barefoot, another wearing a pair of enormous men's trousers and large shirt, others looking tired, pale and unkempt.

6.35 Solicitor Gabriel Black told us of one case which she was free to talk about because no charges were pending against the boy concerned. The case was of a 15-year-old boy arrested as a suspect for murder and held in the police station for two-and-a-half days. The old law required that if a juvenile had to be detained overnight, arrangements had to be made with Social Services for him or her to be kept in their care. But in this case, the boy spent two nights in a locked police cell. His mother had been present during interviews with him and had found them oppressive and very threatening. She had asked the police for Ms Black to be present but they had refused. He was finally released at a police station miles away from Tottenham without any shoes on. We find it quite unacceptable for a young boy to be treated in that way.

6.36 Many allegations were made to us about the conditions of detention and the manner of questioning. Some concerned particular cases of actual maltreatment — deprivation of sleep, assaults and extreme threats. We cannot make findings about these allegations, since in most cases the alleged victims are awaiting trial and we did not hear directly from them. There was other evidence, some of it first hand, about the general pattern of questioning. People who were arrested were told that they were known to be involved in a serious crime — the murder or the rioting. The questioning went on and on. If people denied being involved, they were told that they must have seen who was involved, and names of particular suspects were put to them. If they claimed not to have seen anyone, they were asked about who was likely to have been involved. Panchita La Touche, Deputy Senior Playworker at the Broadwater Farm Play Scheme, described the experience as she saw it:—

"They said they had got strong evidence that I was out there. But I knew I was not out there. I just let them carry on with their games."

They were getting on my nerves, they were annoying me by telling me I was doing something and I knew I wasn't. Trying to get me to tell lies. The next morning they said they had strong evidence that I received bloodstained clothes from a suspect. I said no, that's not true, that's a lie. They said but you know that's the truth, just tell us that. They got on my nerves until they saw that there was nothing that they could do. To get me to tell a lie like that, that's what they wanted. Because they were trying to brainwash me, they were trying to get me to believe it. For me just to give up and say, well, oh yeah, it does go like that. "

6.37 We have to consider this evidence against the background of a serious murder investigation. It is lawful for police officers, if they have genuine grounds for suspecting people, to arrest and question them, putting their suspicions to them and pressing for an answer. But it is not lawful for the police to arrest people "on spec", without any genuine grounds for suspicion, and then try to induce them to implicate themselves or other people. And it is not lawful for the police to use such intense methods, to isolate people for so long, to put such pressure on them that they are confused and, in desperation, admit to things which they have not done.

6.38 Had the police genuine reason to suspect those whom they arrested? Or have they been fishing for information, using conditions, isolation and the fear generated by an accusation of murder to extract unwilling and unreliable answers? Panchita La Touche was clearly a person who was able to defend her innocence. Others were more vulnerable. The story of **Howard Kerr**, reported in the *Daily Mirror* on 20th March 1986, reveals the danger. He was a youth of 17 who was detained for two and a half days. He was not allowed to see a lawyer or relative. He at first claimed that he was in Windsor on the night of 6th October. Later he made a 50 page "confession" to taking part in the riots, naming 20 other "participants", describing a "factory" of petrol bombs, and claiming to have seen the murder of the police officer. But later it was established from independent evidence that he was indeed in Windsor that evening, and the prosecution dropped all charges against him. Outside court he said:—

"I was frightened, so I told them what I thought they wanted to know."

From all the circumstances of the investigation, we fear that there

must be many other young people who were so frightened that they similarly told the police what they thought they wanted to know.

6.39 Andy Shallice, researcher for the Runnymede Trust, gave evidence about the handling of the Broadwater Farm cases in the Magistrates Court. He said that there was a team of officers who presented the Broadwater Farm cases, who objected to bail in 95% of the cases. The most frequent reasons which they gave were that the defendant might commit further offences, or that defendants might be threatened and therefore should be kept in custody for their personal safety. He was concerned that in a number of cases the defence lawyers did not put much energy or effort into pressing for bail. He said that when a Broadwater Farm defendant appeared, it was apparent that the police "took over the cases and the organisation of the court room", particularly by arranging for a number of plain clothes officers to be standing around the court. We are unable to make comment upon individual decisions of the court, but we are concerned that there was not seen to be, in Andy Shallice's words, "a passive and equal atmosphere between defence and prosecution".

6.40 Andy Shallice gave us some particular information about the treatment of juveniles. He said:—

"In the first week after 6th October, four juveniles appeared in court, in the adult court at Tottenham. No reference was made by the Magistrates about the fact that now a juvenile court was essentially sitting. All those juveniles were charged on their own; they weren't charged with adult defendants over the age of 17. The public gallery wasn't cleared, the press were allowed to sit. In another five cases over the next weeks into the end of November, a total of nine juveniles appeared at Tottenham Court during the adult hearings and the public gallery wasn't cleared, and there was no attempt to reconvene the session into a juvenile court for that one hearing."

The law provides that no charge against a juvenile may be heard in an adult court, unless the juvenile is charged jointly with an adult. A juvenile court is not even permitted to sit in a court room which has been or will be used as an adult court within an hour before or after the sitting of the juvenile court. When a juvenile court is sitting, members of the public may not be present unless specially authorised by the court; the press may be present, but may not report the case in any way which might reveal the name or address of the juvenile. We

questioned Andy Shallice closely as to whether there were any adults jointly charged with the same offences at the time that the juveniles were brought into the adult court. He was certain that there were not. We are most concerned about the rights of juveniles which appear not to have been respected by the court.

BROADWATER FARM SINCE OCTOBER 1985

6.41 For three months a massive police presence remained on the estate. The Police Research Unit observed that every day around the estate there was a van filled with riot equipment; a mobile command centre; a mobile incident room; a tea van and mobile toilets; and a number of transit vans full of police. On 1st November their staff counted nine police support units at the entrances to the estate; On 6th November eight; On 13th November seven; And on 18th November thirteen. Every day there was a heavy deployment of uniformed officers patrolling the estate, especially on Tangmere, where they stood about the precinct and the many balconies overlooking it. Reverend John Wheaton, Minister of the Miller Memorial Methodist Church, on the corner of The Avenue and Mount Pleasant Road, described the police presence at this time:—

“In the few weeks after the riot the police were in Mount Pleasant Road with their coaches, vans and real heavy force. It got oppressive after a while; you couldn’t move without seeing a policeman in riot gear. One of their nasty habits, they have stopped it now, was when they parked their vans in Willan Road, Adams Road and Gloucester Road. One of the first things they would do — this went on for over a month after the riot had finished — was to take their riot shields out and line them up against the wall, which I found rather provocative.”

He described also what happened when he visited the family of one of the youths charged with murder:—

“Immediately I approached the front door about four policemen would just appear from around the corner, and when I went out they would still be there. Very polite, but you know you were being kept an eye on.”

6.42 There was a decrease in the numbers after Christmas, and a further decrease after defendants on the murder charge had been committed for trial. The mobile command centre and other vehicles were removed; but there remained a level of patrolling which was far in excess of anything normally seen on an estate or in a residential

area. To this day, it is most unusual to make even a short visit to the estate without seeing two officers walking around, and a van full of officers is normally waiting in The Avenue near the Gloucester Road entrance. Lord Gifford asked a parliamentary question to attempt to discover the precise numbers involved. He asked:—

“What was the level of police manpower deployed on patrolling duties on and around the Broadwater Farm Estate, Tottenham, between 7th October 1985 and 27th March 1986?”

The answer which came back from Lord Glenarthur, Minister of State at the Home Office, was singularly uninformative:—

“I understand from the Commissioner that the level of police manpower deployed on the Broadwater Farm varied during the period in question according to operational demand. On 27th March, 15 officers were deployed on the estate at any one time through the 24 hour period.”

The one figure given in this answer is significant. 15 officers deployed “at any one time” on an estate of 1,000 dwellings, nearly six months after the disturbances, represents a hugely expensive use of police resources. We record below, that we were informed that for every unit of officers on a shift, half will be on patrolling duty at any one time. Allowing for three shifts, the Minister’s answer would indicate that up to 90 police officers were assigned to the estate every day.

6.43 The report of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner for 1985 includes a table headed “Public Order events which required the employment of more than 1,000 officers”. We have studied it with care. There are the following entries which clearly relate to the policing of Broadwater Farm and the surrounding area:—

		Number of police
7th Oct	Aid requirements — central London reserve	1,409
8 & 9 Oct		3,732
10–14 Oct		9,165
15–18 Oct	Aid to ‘Y’ District (Tottenham)	3,044
19 & 20 Oct		1,522
21–27 Oct		3,213
28 Oct–4 Nov		3,744
5–11 Nov		3,744
12–18 Nov		3,104

19-25 Nov	Aid requirements – central London reserve	1,736
26 Nov-2 Dec		1,715
3-9 Dec		1,715
10-16 Dec		1,051

These are extraordinary figures. There are only 12 other entries in this table for the whole of 1985 – major demonstrations, State visits and the London Marathon which have entries of between 1,000 and 2,000 officers, and the Notting Hill Carnival which has an entry of 7,259 officers. They show that in addition to the numbers of police observed on and around the estate, there were hundreds more, even thousands, held in reserve. In the period between 10th and 14th October when the first arrests were made, the number rose to an amazing 9,165. There are no entries which refer to the Brixton disturbances – apart from the Cherry Groce Support Campaign demonstration on 11th November (1,405 officers). The huge numbers of police assigned to Y District appear to us to be a measure of the serious over-reaction to the 6th October disturbances which continued for an excessive time.

6.44 The Richards report stated that high profile uniformed policing was necessary “to maintain the Queen’s peace, reduce the fear of crime and enhance the quality of life for the residents”. He listed four further considerations:–

- (1) To afford protection to the patrolling uniformed officers.
- (2) To give support to residents who have made statements to the police and felt under threat.
- (3) To respond to the call of many who have articulated their need for a heavy police presence.
- (4) To give support to C.I.D officers who are executing search warrants and making arrests.

6.45 On 5th November 1985, the Chief Executive wrote to D.A.C. Richards stating that the numbers of police officers on the estate and particularly on Tangmere were seen as “stressful and oppressive”, and, as owners of the estate, asked the police to leave. Commander Richards replied that he would reduce the police presence “when I am satisfied that the likelihood of further breaches of the peace has receded”. He reiterated his request for a police room to be allocated on the estate. There was further correspondence, and the council said that they were seriously considering instituting legal proceedings.

Finally, in what was described by Roy Limb as a “very responsible act”, council members decided that to fight a legal battle with the police would be a bad move, which the community would not like to see, and that they should use every endeavour to secure a reduction to normal levels of policing without going to court.

6.46 The most recent public statement about the level of policing was made by Chief Superintendent Alan Stainsby, who took over as senior officer of the Tottenham Division in April 1986. Speaking to a meeting of the Community and Police Consultative Group on 15th May 1986, he said that at present there were 60 officers a day assigned to the estate, mostly from outside the division. There were three shifts of 20, of whom ten were on duty at any one time. They were not always patrolling, but often stayed in their transit vans keeping a watch out. He said there was no desire to intimidate residents. He said that he was taking steps to phase out the assistance from outside the division, and instead to set up a team of 16 Tottenham officers in two shifts from 8 a.m to 12 midnight, eight officers per shift. He hoped that after August this team would have taken over from the outside police officers, and at present the prospects looked good. However if there were further grounds for tension, the levels would have to be increased again. He recognised that this was “an extremely expensive form of policing”, and hoped that in due course the team could be reduced to below 16 officers. He was asked directly about the idea of a mini-police station, and replied:–

“I can police Broadwater Farm with eight officers without a section house on the estate.”

6.47 There were some people who were reassured by the large numbers of police in the early months, but many who found them intimidating and oppressive. Michael Hutchinson-Reis described it as:–

“A style and a school of policing that has more in common with the occupation of a foreign country by a colonising power.”

Our own view is that the numbers of police officers on the estate in the months following 6th October were grossly excessive and did have the effect of intimidating many residents. We can fully understand the need to deploy large numbers of police officers in support of those who were making arrests or carrying out searches on particular occasions. But it was not necessary to cover the estate around the clock with police officers who were doing nothing except stand about

or patrol. The position in law is that if a group of ordinary citizens had done what the police were doing, they would have been guilty of a nuisance to the residents on the estate, and in addition (after the council had asked them to leave) of a trespass. Police officers are only entitled to interfere with people's rights in such a way where there is a real and imminent possibility of a breach of the peace. In such cases they may take reasonable preventative measures. There have been no attacks on the police on Broadwater Farm since 6th October. We know of no evidence that further disturbances were likely, and we think that the measures taken far exceeded what was reasonable.

6.48 The position today is considerably better, and witnesses who had found the previous numbers of police officers most oppressive, found the present levels bearable. Our survey which was carried out after the significant reductions in the number of police, found that 35% of residents considered that the present levels were too high, 15% that they were too low, and 50% that they were about right. We return to this question of levels of policing in Chapter 8.

6.49 As well as their numbers, the actions and attitudes of officers on the estate have offended many people. Community worker Rupert Downing tried to intervene after a man had been arrested and a senior officer was shouting at the crowd who had gathered. He described the reaction of the officer when he pleaded with him to calm the situation:—

“He didn't quite physically attack me but he looked as though he wanted to, and he said something like ‘you council worker bastards, you're responsible for the riot in the first place — you'd better watch it. We can nick you as well.’”

6.50 Many people fear that police officers patrolling the estate are affected by feelings of hatred and revenge towards Black people because of the death of PC Blakelock. The Middlesex Area Probation Service considered that this fear was justified. In their submission to us they wrote:—

“During the days following the disturbances certain numbers of our staff came into contact with several policemen and heard them talking of revenge and ‘sorting out’ the people on the estate. There is a real fear in the area, which is made worse by rumour and speculation, that a minority of police officers might exceed their

authority and take advantage of any future disorder to satisfy their sense of grievance.”

But there was evidence that some police officers were not prepared to be swayed by the reputation of the estate. Russell Simper, the Estate Supervisor, told us of words which he had heard spoken by an officer from outside the Tottenham area:—

“Well, I've got a different attitude towards the Farm to what I had when I first came. I expected to come and see a load of rogues, villains and vagabonds, but I find the majority of the people on this estate very nice people.”

6.51 Hugh Sutherland, who is employed as a carpenter in the council's repairs unit on the estate, experienced provocation and racist abuse in a particularly ugly way, culminating in an arrest and charge. Police officers after the disturbances would follow him and his girlfriend, making monkey noises and making remarks like “climbed any good trees lately?”. His Ford Capri car was frequently covered with stickers saying “I love the Met”. He would partly peel them off and dispose of them. After some weeks of this, he was peeling off these stickers in the presence of a number of officers who were saying “What's the matter? Don't you love the Met then?”. As he peeled stickers off the back window, he found that others had been stuck on the windscreen. He swore at the police and said that he would report them. On 16th December, a few days later, he was about his business on the estate when six or seven police officers came running towards him. They grabbed hold of him by the arms. One of them hit him in the face saying “Well Mr Fucking Mouthy Orange Capri, we've got you now, you cunt!” He was bundled into a police van, forced to lie down in the van, where officers kicked him and rested their feet on him. He had a badly cut and swollen face and bruised ribs for some weeks afterwards. He was charged with abusive behaviour, but the case was dismissed by the Magistrates Court. The case aroused considerable anger among **Hugh Sutherland's** fellow workers. Trade Unions organised a demonstration at the court and a one day strike, in which about 300 employees took part.

6.52 Having so many police officers on the estate and on call also leads to the danger of trivial incidents leading to large-scale confrontation. Michael Hutchinson-Reis was surrounded by five or six police officers when he went to collect a briefcase out of a colleague's car. Sheila Ramdin described an incident at the end of May, the day

before she gave evidence, when she had seen two boys having a disagreement, and two patrolling officers went to see what was happening:—

“I just heard one of the police say ‘do you need assistance?’ and before you knew it there was about three vans downstairs, and 20 of them just came running upstairs, just standing there to see what was going on”.

6.53 However, not everyone who acted cheekily was the object of such attention from the police. Ernie Large tested out his theory that it was Black people who were the targets of attention, on a day in October, when there were masses of police on the estate:—

“I drove round the estate a number of times minus a tax disc. I took out the tax disc and put a photo of my cat in place of it. I drove round there with the police in their dozens looking over the balcony, patrolling along the side. I also experimented by going in at Willan Road and coming out at Gloucester Road — backwards. A number of times. With all those attendant police, although I was looked at, I was never stopped once.”

6.54 The events of 6th October and the subsequent police action have had deep and painful affects on the people of Broadwater Farm.

Social worker Michael Hutchinson-Reis summed up the situation in these terms:—

“In general terms the situation that many people are living in is so extreme and severe that the overall effect is to make people feel intimidated, fearful and very frightened. Certainly I myself have experienced the feeling that even though I am a social worker carrying an I.D card, I’m liable to arrest and detention and my family and friends won’t know where I am. The realisation that that could happen to you at any moment is quite frightening.”

He spoke about a young man who had committed suicide in April 1986 as being “a casualty of the situation in which Black communities and the people of Broadwater Farm in particular have to live.” Mary John Baptiste, representing the Defence Campaign spoke of one woman who had developed a form of agoraphobia; she will not leave her house since the police raided it, and is terrified of her children leaving the house. Sheila Ramdin told us that the Mothers’ Project were trying to form a family support group in order to provide support and counselling to both adults and children who had been psychologically affected.

6.55 We have heard disturbing stories about the effect of the police actions upon children. Community worker Joanne George, who has children aged four and five, said:—

“My children now believe that the police are going to get me. They say to me ‘Oh mummy, don’t let the police get you’. If they see a policeman they will want to run up and fight him — which is unbelievable. My child actually kicked a policeman in Tangmere — I was horrified, I had to run up and go and rescue my child.”

Sheila Ramdin spoke of walking with a friend when two police officers came towards them. She described the reaction of her friends’ four year old boy:—

“The boy was on the floor, he was just screaming, saying ‘no Mummy I can see police’. He was really shaking. I had never seen anything like it.”

She spoke also of her own child aged four, who was shaking with fear when there was a blackout on the estate and a fire engine came. He was crying “Mummy what’s happening? Are they going to fight again?” Michael Hutchinson-Reis spoke of a child suffering an anxiety attack on 5th November, when fireworks and bonfires caused him to cling to his mother and scream with fear. Not everyone agreed that there had been psychological damage to children; Ronny Roach, senior worker at the play centre felt the children had not seen the riots as a real situation. But we remain very worried about the evidence on this point which we have heard.

6.56 After 6th October there was a rush of tenants asking for transfer requests. Many who were already on the transfer list came into the Neighbourhood Office, and about 90 to 100 new tenants made applications for transfers. The pressure eased off rapidly after the first two or three weeks. Some of those requesting transfers had clearly been urged to do so by younger relatives who were worried about their welfare. The Neighbourhood Officer, Neale Coleman said that a lot of people still did want to move, and had done before the disturbances: but the intense pressure on his office levelled off much more quickly than he had anticipated. We deal in the next chapter with the views that people have expressed about living on the estate.

6.57 In the minds of people outside the estate it carries an even more undesirable label than before. The experience of one woman whom we interviewed was :—

"Even when I go for a job, and they say where do you live, and I say Broadwater Farm, they look at you totally different."

Many other witnesses spoke of similar experiences when they told people where they lived. The post box in Gloucester Road was sealed up after 6th October and remains so to the present date. It has become more difficult than ever to obtain credit. Mail order firms, TV hire companies, and companies trading on hire purchase are reluctant to deal with people on the estate and in many cases have refused outright. Deposits of £100 are demanded for the connection of electricity or gas. Pat Ford complained to the Consumer Protection Service after Visionhire refused to offer slot TV rentals after the disturbances. The answer given by the company to the Consumer Protection Officer was:—

"It was considered unreasonable to ask our teleclub meter collectors to make calls on the estate as this could well lead to possible injuries to our staff who were known to be carrying reasonable large sums of money."

6.58 The community spirit, so bouyant in summer 1985, was far more subdued as the summer of 1986 began. The numbers taking part in community activities had gone down — particularly those such as the Mothers' Project which drew in people from outside the estate. One woman said to us that the community feeling was gone — it used to be "alive and happy with the music, but now it's so quiet". Cliff Ford felt that the atmosphere was "just beginning to come somewhere around normal, where you can see children playing around again, but it's only recently that that started to happen." Panchita La Touche felt that people trusted each other much less than before. Several people involved with the Youth Association spoke of a sense of despair about the future. Even so, they were continuing the day-to-day work of maintaining and extending services to their community. The old people never stopped coming to the Youth Association for their meals. The projects created over the last five years still continue. As we explain more fully in our recommendations in Chapter 8, it is more important than ever to give support to the initiatives of the Broadwater Farm community.

Chapter 7

WHO LIVES ON BROADWATER FARM — — WHAT DO THEY THINK?

7.1 The Inquiry carried out a survey of the estate. We ensured that the stratified sample that we interviewed would be representative by drawing on a sample of 700 adults. In the 1981 Census there were 1063 households and some 1800 adults. Our sample was one adult from each of 700 households. This represents a sample size which is many times larger than necessary to ensure complete statistical representativeness. We took such a large sample for two reasons, firstly to ensure that we could fully defend the representative nature of the sample, secondly so that we could break down the responses by age, gender and ethnicity, and still ensure that there were sufficient people within each category to provide a fully representative sample. Given the whole nature of statistical sampling we can be sure that these statistics represent the true picture of the residents of Broadwater Farm Estate in April/May 1986.

7.2 We commissioned a group of social scientists from Middlesex Polytechnic to carry out this survey for us. They had recently been involved in the Islington Crime Survey which had received some considerable acclaim both in the academic and popular press. They had experience of carrying out research in an area with diverse minority ethnic groups and analysing that data quickly. We drew up a questionnaire in conjunction with this group and within a few weeks of the Inquiry starting we were able to begin the field work.

7.3 We achieved a very high response rate of 75.2%. This means that some 527 individuals co-operated with the interviewers in providing us with information. This very high response rate compares